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Summary  findings
"Deep integration" - explicit government actions to  members and nonmembers of a PTA, regionalism as an
reduce the market-segmenting effect of domestic  instrument of trade and investment becomes more
regulatory policies through coordination and  attractive.
cooperation  - is becoming a major dimension of some  Using a standard competitive general equilibrium
regional integration agreements, led by the European  model of the Egyptian economy, Hoekman and Konan
Union. Health and safety regulations, competition laws,  find that the static welfare impact of a "deep" free trade
licensing and certification regimes, and administrative  agreement is far greater than the impact that can be
procedures such as customs clearance can affect trade (in  expected from a classic "shallow" agreement. Under
ways analogous to nontariff barriers) even though their  some scenarios, welfare may increase by more than  10
underlying intent may not be to discriminate against  percent  of GDP, compared with close to zero under a
foreign suppliers of goods and services.  shallow agreement.
Whether  preferential trade agreements (PTAs) can be  Given Egypt's highly diversified trading patterns, a
justified in a multilateral trading system depends on the  shallow PTA with the European Union could be merely
extent  to which formal intergovernmental agreements  diversionary, leading to a small decline in welfare. Egypt
are tecbnically necessary to achieve the deep integration  already has duty-free access to the European Union for
needed to make markets more contestable. The more  manufactures, so the loss in tariff revenues incurred
need for formal cooperation, the stronger the case for  would outweigh any new trade created.
regional integration.  Large gains in welfare from the PTA are conditional on
Whether  PTAs are justified regionally also depends on  eliminating regulatory barriers and red tape - in which
whether  efforts to reduce market segmentation are  case welfare gains may be substantial: 4 to 20 percent
applied on a nondiscriminatory  basis. If innovations to  growth in real GNP.
reduce transaction or market access costs extend to both
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"Deep integration"-explicit  actions by governments to reduce the market segmenting effect
of domestic regulatory policies through coordination and cooperation-is  becoming a major
dimension of some regional integration agreements, led by the EU. Health and safety
regulations, competition laws, licensing and certification regimes, and administrative
procedures such as customs clearance practices can have effects analogous to nontariff barriers
(NTBs) to trade, even though the underlying intent may not be to discriminate against foreign
suppliers of goods and services. Often integration can be pursued unilaterally through decisions
by governments to recognize a partner's policies or to adopt a partner's regulatory stance in
specific areas (harmonization). But deeper integration may also require far-reaching
cooperation and "sharing" of sovereignty.
A key question in evaluating the justification for preferential trade agreements (PTAs) from a
multilateral trading system perspective is the extent to which formal intergovermmental
agreements are technically necessary to achieve the deep integration necessary to promote
greater contestability of markets. The more this is so, the stronger the potential case for pursuit
of regional integration. Another question that is relevant in evaluating the case for regionalism
is the extent to which actions taken in the PTA context to reduce market segmentation can be
and are applied on a nondiscriminatory basis. If PTA-based deep integration innovations to
reduce transactions or market access costs extend to nonmembers as well as members of a
PTA, this increases the attractiveness of regionalism as an instrument of trade and investment
policy reform.
In this paper we investigate the potential importance of deep integration in the context of trade
agreements the EU has concluded with Mediterranean countries. We consider the case of Egypt
for illustrative purposes. The government is far advanced in negotiations with the European
Union (EU) to establish a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA), and in 1997 agreement was
reached in the Arab League to establish a FTA over a 10 year period starting in 1998. Neither
of these agreements does much to pursue a deep integration agenda, although the EU FTA has
the potential to do so. In this paper we quantify the magnitude of the opportunity costs of not
doing so, taking into account that unilateral elimination of some regulatory barriers on a
nondiscriminatory basis may not be feasible, and that Mediterranean countries may be able to
improve market access opportunities in the EU if the agenda is "deepened".
Given Egypt's diversified trading patterns, a shallow PTA with the EU (limited to elimination
of Egyptian tariffs) will lead to a small welfare decline. This reflects the fact that Egypt already -
has duty-free access to the EU for manufactures-the  loss in tariff revenues that will be
incurred outweighs any trade creation that will result. Large welfare gains from a EU FTA are
conditional upon the elimination of regulatory barriers and red tape. If deep integration efforts
are pursued that deliver such an improvement in the business environment, the welfare gains
may be substantial, from 4 percent to upwards of 20 percent growth in real GNP.  The variance
in these impact results indicates that it is important to have a good sense of how large the
regulatory costs are, whether elimination of regulatory barriers can be applied on anondiscriminatory basis, and whether the barriers create rents or are largely frictional
(resource-wasting) in nature.
Our results suggest that the additional impact of services liberalization may be significant.
Improvements in service efficiency lead not only to a gain in domestic welfare and output but
also to an improved export position. The potential welfare gains to better access to European
service markets may be quite substantial. Given low trade barriers in the EU and the relatively
high tariffs maintained by Egypt and other Arab countries, there are also potentially large gains
associated with intra-Arab trade liberalization. Here again much depends on the availability of
accurate information on the actual trade policies of the Arab countries vis a vis each other.
These are difficult to come by. To the best of our knowledge, no comparable cross-country
empirical analyses have been undertaken to estimate what the tariff equivalents are of the
various regulation-related trade costs that currently exist in the Arab region more generally.
Without such empirical work-which  should span both product and service markets-
computational work of the kind attempted in this paper will necessarily be subject to large
margins of error.
Despite the weakness of the datasets that are available, the major points that emerge from the
analysis are fully consistent with the economic theory and analytical models.  PTAs that are
limited to the elimination of tariffs for merchandise trade flows are of limited value at best, and
may as easily be welfare reducing as welfare enhancing.  It is important that PTAs go beyond
elimination of tariffs and quotas to include regulatory and red tape costs, as well as efforts to
open service markets to foreign competition. Both policymakers and analysts must take into
account that some types of "red tape" stemming from the enforcement of regulatory regimes
cannot be eliminated unilaterally on a nondiscriminatory basis. To the extent that this is the
case, account must be taken of the need to negotiate formal recognition agreements and
equivalent instruments. These may give rise to large gains, but should be pursued on a
nondiscriminatory basis, i.e., in the WTO context.1.  Introduction
There is an extensive literature on the economics of preferential trade agreements (PTAs). One
strand of this literature emphasizes the role of PTAs as instruments used by governments in the
pursuit of "deep integration" (e.g., Lawrence, 1996), which for purposes of this paper is defined
as explicit actions by governments to reduce the market segmenting effect of domestic (non-
border) regulatory policies through coordination and cooperation. Examples are health and safety
regulations, competition laws, licensing and certification regimes, prudential requirements,
environmental norns,  and administrative procedures such as customs clearance practices. Such
regulatory policies have effects analogous to nontariff barriers (NTBs) to trade, even though the
underlying intent may not be to discriminate against foreign suppliers of goods and services.
Indeed, the regulations concerned may apply equally to domestic and foreign products or
producers, in contrast to standard NTBs. Nonetheless, they can act to segment markets and
reduce competition.
The regulatory barriers and measures that figure on the "deep integration" agenda often
belong to the class of market segmenting policies that either impose real resource or frictional
costs on international exchange of goods and factors, or prohibit new entry on markets
altogether. Often integration can be pursued unilaterally through decisions by governments to
recognize a partner's policies or to adopt a partner's regulatory stance in specific areas
(harmonization). But deeper integration may also require far-reaching cooperation and "sharing"
of sovereignty. A key question in evaluating the justification for PTAs from a multilateral trading
system perspective is the extent to which formal intergovernmental agreements are technically
necessary to achieve the deep integration necessary to promote greater contestability of markets.
1The more this is so, the stronger the potential case for pursuit of regional integration. Another
question that is relevant in evaluating the case for regionalism is the extent to which actions
taken in the PTA context to reduce market segmentation can be and are applied on a
nondiscriminatory basis. If PTA-based deep integration innovations to reduce transactions or
market access costs extend to nonmembers as well as members of a PTA, this increases the
attractiveness of regionalism as an instrument of trade and investment policy reform.
This paper investigates the potential importance of deep integration in the context of trade
agreements the EU has concluded with Mediterranean countries. It is sometimes argued these
PTAs will be detrimental to Mediterranean countries because they will give rise to trade
diversion (Schiff, 1997). But if a Euro-Mediterranean agreement (EMA) reduces regulatory
impediments in both the EU and partner country markets, the potential welfare gains may
increase substantially.
We consider the case of Egypt for illustrative purposes, largely driven by the fact that a
significant amount of analytical work on Egypt already exists (Maskus and Konan, 1997,
Hoekman, Konan and Maskus, 1998). The government is far advanced in negotiations with the
European Union (EU) to establish a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA),'  and in 1997
agreement was reached in the Arab League to establish a FTA over a 10 year period starting in
1998.2  Neither of these agreements does much to pursue a policy integration agenda, although the
EMA has the potential to do so. One motivation for this paper is to quantify the magnitude of the-
'  Such FTAs have already been concluded between the EU and Israel, Jordan, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority,
and Tunisia.  Discussions are ongoing with Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon and Syria. See Galal and Hoekman (1997) for
assessments of the Tunisian and Moroccan agreements and analysis of the issues for Egypt.
2  The recent Arab League FTA may to some extent have been motivated by a desire to avoid the negative
implications of an emerging "hub and spoke" network of bilateral Euro-Med agreements.
2opportunity costs of not doing so, taking into account that unilateral elimination of all regulatory
barriers on a nondiscriminatory basis may not be feasible.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews a number of conceptual issues that
arise in the context of policy integration. Section 3 describes the status quo policies in Egypt that
characterize the benchmark for simulation analysis.  Section 4 describes the model, datasets, and
the main scenarios that are evaluated.  Section 5 reports the results of the simulation analyses.
Section 6 concludes.
2.  Conceptual Issues
As tariffs and related "traditional" trade barriers decline in importance, industries have started to
focus on the consequences of differences in regulatory regimes across countries for their ability
to compete. Regulatory regime differences may have consequences for the degree to which the
contestability of markets is enhanced following a significant reduction or the complete
elimination of trade control measures.  Commonly mentioned examples concern the prevalence
of state-owned or controlled industries/firms, the extent to which governments subsidize the
activities of domestic industry, and the competition policy (antitrust) regime that applies. The
greater the role of the state in the economy and the more tolerant a government is of
anticompetitive business practices such as cartels, bid rigging and other horizontal restraints, the
less impact a formal elimination of trade barriers may have on the contestability of markets.
Although the market segmenting effects of regulatory policies may be intentional, in
many cases this simply is a side effect. For example, the enforcement of health and safety
standards requires testing and conformity assessment procedures for products. These presumably
will apply equally to domestic and imported goods.  But exporters may already be subject to
3equivalent controls in their home country, so that testing is duplicative, leading to higher
compliance costs for foreign firms.  Customs procedures may also be duplicative insofar as
paperwork and data requirements have already been demanded by authorities in the home
country or are not relevant to the needs of customs. Such policies may therefore be largely
resource-wasting and redundant.
It has been estimated that over 60 percent of US exports are subject to mandatory health,
safety, and related standards. For exports to the EU, government-issued certificates were required
for 45 percent of these goods, private, third party certification was accepted in 15 percent of
cases, and for the remainder manufacturers self-certification sufficed (Wilson, 1998). Within the
EU, some 75 percent of the value of intra-EU trade in goods is subject to mandatory technical
regulations (European Commission, 1996). Conformity assessment policies may therefore
constitute an important technical barrier to trade. Their prevalence has risen rapidly. The EU now
requires third-party testing, certification, or quality system registration for certain regulated
sectors by organizations designated, or "notified", to the Commission by the member states as
technically competent. Only these bodies can approve goods for circulation in European markets
and affix the European "CE Mark" to certified products. Unter (1998) estimates that in the case
of the Hewlett-Packard company redundant testing and conformity assessment procedures
increased six-fold between 1990 and 1997. Similar situations apply to services producers, where
the need for licensing and certification of suppliers and prudential supervision may be duplicated
across countries. Often such requirements are complemented by outright market access
restrictions for foreign providers. The result is generally higher cost supply and the creation of
rents for domestic suppliers.
4The major options for dealing with the market segmenting and/or anticompetitive effects
of regulation are harmonization and acceptance (or "recognition") of  regulatory policy regimes.
Each of these options may be pursued unilaterally or in a concerted manner. Harmonization may
involve adoption by one country of another country's  set of rules, or the negotiation of a
common set of disciplines that imply changes for both (or all) countries.  Examples abound of
unilateral or independent harmonization to the standard of a trading partner.  These are often
driven by market size disparities.  An example was a 1992 decision by Canada to adopt the US
emission standards for automobiles that were specified in the US Clean Air Act of 1990 so as to
ensure that auto makers located in Canada could realize economies of scale (avoid having to set
up separate production lines for the Canadian and US market). Another example driven by
market access considerations was a decision Switzerland to adopt the EU regime on technical
regulations and industrial standards (in effect the acquis communautaire). This ensured that
Swiss goods can enter and circulate in the EU on the same basis as EU-produced goods
(Messerlin, 1998).3  Numerous developing countries have pursued a unilateral harmonization
strategy. Often this was done by maintaining systems inherited from a colonial past or military
occupation, but more deliberate efforts have also been made. South Korea, for example, adopted
many German and US technical product regulations in the 1950s, as part of a strategy to upgrade
the quality of industrial production and foster exports.
Harmonization may also be based on inter-governmental cooperation and agreement, or
involve a decision to cede sovereignty to common or supra-national institutions. The latter is
often regarded in the literature as a necessary condition for economic integration to occur-
However,  it did require a number  of MRAs  as well.  Switzerland  was put into a special  situation  because
other  EFTA  members  either  joined  the EU or the EEA. Under  the EEA,  EFTA  members  agreed to adopt  the acquis,
5Robson (1988) defines integration as "the assignment of particular economic functions and
instruments to the union or community and their exercise at that level rather than at the level of
the member states." Supranational institutions may be involved in the process of setting the rules
of the game (as in the case of the EU, where the Commission has been delegated the power of
proposing directives and regulations), and/or the enforcement of negotiated commitments (e.g.,
acceptance by PTA member states of binding, independent third party adjudication or arbitration
as in NAFTA; or more far-reaching, the creation of a supra-national institution such as the Court
of Justice in the EU).
A complement of unilateral harmonization to the standards of a trading partner or
international norms is unilateral recognition of foreign regulatory regimes. Thus, a government
may decide that the professional qualifications of doctors trained and certified in certain
countries are sufficient for them to practice (although nationality constraints and economic needs
tests may still prohibit entry by foreign service providers).  Similarly, a government may accept
foreign certificates of safety for certain imports as sufficient proof of quality (e.g., the
Underwriters Laboratories (UL) mark is accepted in many countries).  However, the ability of
unilateral recognition to reduce transaction costs is inherently limited to the jurisdiction of the
government concerned.  In some cases a government or regulatory body may not be familiar with
or trust foreign certification systems, or may consider foreign standards to be unacceptable. If so,
products will be subjected to testing and certification at point of entry into its jurisdiction,
imposing additional costs on imports. Negotiation of mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) is a
mechanism through which transactions costs can then be reduced further. MRAs may be required
even if a harmonization strategy is pursued by a country, as the trading partner whose standards
which  automatically  implied  accepting  to apply  EU  standards.
6are emulated may not accept foreign test results or conformity assessment systems as equivalent
to its own, even if the formal standards are identical. Conversely, MRAs may require some
degree of harmnonization,  especially in areas where mandatory standards or regulations apply, so
as to ensure that the underlying norms satisfy certain basic, minimum standards.
An important empirical question is to determine the size of the potential benefits of
regional deep integration initiatives. Relatively little work has been done on this, almost all of it-
focusing on the EU's  Single Market Programme. One conclusion that emerges from this work
(e.g., Winters 1992; Baldwin, 1995) is that the welfare impact of deep integration will be greater
the more the restrictions being addressed waste real resources rather than generate rents that are
captured by interest groups. If there is no rent or revenue for a country to lose by removing the
restriction, gains will be greater from eliminating them than if the measures create rents.
Estimates of average frictional costs in the EU prior to the Single Market programme ranged
between 2 and 3 percent of the value of trade (EC, 1996). In some areas or sectors the figures
were even higher. The requirement that conformity assessments be performed by European
notified bodies-in  limited cases the EU has authorized subcontracting by notified bodies to
allow certification by foreign firms-raises  the costs of testing and certification to non-EU
manufacturers in some sectors. The 1997 US-EU MRA on telecommunications and information
technology products has been estimated to eliminate frictional costs equivalent to a 5 percent
"tax" on the value of the goods traded (Wilson, 1998). Such costs are likely to be higher in
developing countries.
It is also important to determine to what extent regulatory reform can be achieved
unilaterally as opposed to requiring formal, international agreements. Unilateral reforms may be
sufficient to realize a significant share of the total potential gains from deep integration but can
7only affect domestic markets (imports). Formal international agreements may have an impact in
facilitating exports as well, as market access becomes less costly. How much more can be
obtained from international cooperation as compared to unilateral reform is unknown. The same
is true regarding the extent to which deep integration eliminates regulatory costs for importers
and exporters on a nondiscriminatory basis. Both MRAs and harmonization decisions may be
inherently discriminatory with respect to outsiders. In the former case, discrimination may be
implied if recognition is not extended to some countries. Harmonization may increase barriers to
trade for third parties if their national standards or norms differ from the common norm applied
in the PTA. Consequently, it cannot be assumed that reductions in real costs associated with
actions to reduce the market segmenting effect of differences in regulatory regimes will benefit
nonmembers.
Much depends in this connection on the types of barriers that are involved. Some
reductions in trade costs can be extended to all sources of imports. An example is simplification
of customs clearance procedures and associated documentary requirements. Other liberalization
actions will not automatically extend to third countries. Examples include decisions to link
computer systems of Customs, accept self-declaration for purposes of enforcement of mandatory
product standards and related testing and certification procedures or recognize professional
qualifications.
.umming up, the impact of a PTA on members and the rest of the world depends
importantly on the extent to which the market segmenting regulatory barriers are eliminated;
whether these are frictional in nature, whether reforms can be pursued unilaterally, and whether
policy integration benefits extend on a nondiscriminatory basis. The greater the share of
frictional barriers in the total set of barriers that is removed by the PTA, the more market access
8opportunities in partner country markets improve, and the greater the extent to which own barrier
removal extends to imports from non PTA members, the more beneficial it will be. These are
empirical questions or issues that should figure in any evaluation of a PTA. What follows makes
an attempt to determine the possible quantitative importance of some of these factors using a
CGE model of the Egyptian economy.
3.  Egypt:  Pattern of Trade and Micro Policy Distortions
Given the recent decision to establish an Arab League FTA and ongoing negotiations on a FTA
with the EU, bilateral Egyptian trade flows are separated into four regions: the EU (including
Turkey), 4 the United States, the Arab League, and the rest of the world (ROW). 5 The EU is Egypt's
largest trading partner, accounting for roughly 40 percent of merchandise imports in 1995 and
absorbing 45 percent of Egypt's exports. The US comes second in terms of imports, accounting for
19 percent of total imports, while the Arab League is the second most important export market for
Egypt, absorbing 16 percent of all exports of goods in 1995. As shown in Table 1, in many product
categories, including processed foodstuffs, wood products, paper and printing, glass and mineral
products, transport equipment, more than 50 percent of total Egyptian exports go to Arab markets.
In contrast, Egypt imports relatively little from the Arab League region. The most important in
terms of import shares are petroleum products, beverages, and textiles and clothing. Despite their
relatively large presence in production, vegetable foodstuffs and food processing are major import
goods, as are machinery and chemicals. On the export side, Egypt's trade flows are dominated by
transport services (largely because of the Suez Canal), oil, and tourism. Textiles and clothing are
4  Turkey  is included  in the EU grouping  because  Turkey  has recently concluded  an agreement  to form a customs
union  with  the European  Union,  implying  that  any  FTA  with  the EU  will automatically  be extended  to Turkey.
9the major the exports of manufactures. Only 40 percent of merchandise exports to the EU comprise
manufactured goods. These tend to be relatively low skill, labor-intensive. In product lines in SITC
chapter 6 (products embodying materials like leather, fibers, wood or paper), the revealed
comparative advantage index is above one, indicating that Egyptian firns  have an above averag-e
share of world exports (Yeats, 1995).  The intra-industry trade index with the EU in 1994 was 0.14,
as compared to 0.28, 0.3, and 0.43 for Turkey, Tunisia and Israel respectively (World Bank, 1995).
We draw two conclusions from these statistics. First, although the EU is by far the largest
trading partner of Egypt, trade flows are rather diversified. The non-Arab, non-EU, non-US "rest of
the world" provides 34% of irnports and takes 25% of exports. These numbers suggest that the
potential for trade diversion from a "classic" preferential trade agreement with just one of Egypt's
major trading partners is significant. Second, services play an important role in Egypt's current
account. As there are no disaggregated data available on services trade or its breakdown by region,
for purposes of the modeling exercise that follows it is assumed that the Arab League region has a
40 percent export share; the EU 25 percent; and the US 7 percent (see Table 1).6
Although tariffs have been declining in recent years-the  maximum tariff was recently
reduced to 50 percent-at  around 20 to 25 percent the import weighted average tariff is still
relatively high.  Tariffs on inputs are often lower than those applied to final goods, leading to
effective rates of protection that are often a multiple of nominal rates. 7 With the exception of
This  section  draws on Maskus  and Konan (1997)  and Hoekman,  Konan  and Maskus  (1998).
6 The Arab  share  is assumed  to be higher  than  for merchandise  reflecting  the similarity  in language,  the importance  of
proximity  for service  delivery,  and  the prevailing  policy  of favoring  Arab  services-related  investment.  In earlier  work,
(Konan  and  Maskus 1997a;  Maskus  and Konan 1997)  it is assumed  that  services  trade  is closely  complementary  to
merchandise  trade  in terms  of its sources  so that  regional  shares  of services  trade equal  each  region's  share  in total
merchandise  trade. In this  paper this  is assumption  is only  maintained  for export  shares  of the Suez canal.
7  However,  if account  is taken  of the fact  that services  are heavily  protected,  average  effective  rates  of protection
for manufacturing  are much smaller. See Hoekman  and Djankov  (1997).  It is also  the case  that total  tariff revenue
10those on imports of textile products, all quantitative restrictions have been abolished, and the
textile bans are scheduled to be eliminated in the coming years as part of Egypt's  commitments
under the Uruguay Round. 8
As tariffs and quotas have declined in importance, administrative control of the import
process has become more prominent and important. Such controls and "red tape" are reflected in
customs clearance procedures, in the enforcement of national health and safety standards, and in
the logistics involved in moving shipments to, through, and from ports. These controls impose
real trade costs on the private sector, both directly in terms of financial charges and indirectly
through the opportunity costs of delays incurred in customs clearance (Kheir El Din, 1998).
Customs valuation and classification practices are problematic. Assessed values are frequently
reported to exceed invoice values, and applied tariffs may be a multiple of the statutory rate. 9
Invoices are frequently rejected-in  the case of one large foreign firm, 200 out of some 600
declarations in 1996 were rejected/contested. The Egyptian system of standards and technical
regulation is a major bottleneck for importers. Up to five agencies may independently inspect
and test consignments for conformity with Egyptian "quality control" standards. As of 1994
some 1,550 tariff lines (25 percent of the tariff schedule) were subject to such controls. 10 As is
the case for tariff rates, many of which escalate sharply, fees for goods that are intended for retail
collections  are less  than what should be collected  if all tariffs were fully  applied,  reflecting  a variety  of exemptions,
including  Arab League  preferences,  as well as circumnvention.
s Kheir el Din and El Sayed  (1997).
9  The variance  in valuation  and applied  rates can be significant. Data  provided  by importers  in 1995  suggest  that
assessed  values  for capital equipment  may exceed  invoice  values  by 25 percent  or more,  while applied  tariffs  may
exceed  the applicable  statutory  rates  by an even wider  margin. See World  Bank, 1995.
10  Consignments  that were rejected  in 1993  included  fasteners,  spare  parts for cars; transformers;  pressure  cookers;
filters;  brake pads; ceramic  tiles, light bulbs;  ballpoint  pens;  washing  machines;  wheat;  fresh fruit;  dried  fruit;
sesame;  frozen  meat; and frozen  fish.
11sale were generally at least twice as large as those that applied if further processing occurred in
Egypt. Nathan Associates (1996) estimate that the direct and indirect costs of the system of
standards and technical product regulations increased costs for traders and producers by between
5 and 90 percent, depending on the industry, with the highest costs for food products and
imported final consumer goods.
An absence of competition in key service sectors also imposes excess costs on business.
Only Egyptian nationals may import. Fees charged by the public companies providing port
services for handling and storage of goods are some 30 percent higher than in neighboring
countries or nations with which Egypt competes, while these companies do not provide quality
service in return. Maritime shipping is a monopoly of the state-owned Egyptian Maritime
Navigation Company. A 1994 survey revealed that the cost of shipment and handling in Egypt of
a standard container was 27, 22, and 19 percent higher than in Jordan, Syria and Turkey,
respectively (Mohieldin, 1997). Foreign finns seeking to advertise their goods pay a multiple of
the rates charged for domestic producers. Low quality and high cost telecommunications impose
additional costs on the private sector. The telecommunications provider is an inefficient public
monopoly-waiting  times for new lines, revenue per line and percentage of completed calls are
among the lowest in the Middle East. National and international communications are a multiple
of cost, reflecting a policy of cross-subsidizing local calls. The company manufactures telephone
sets and small switches itself. Insurance is dominated by three public sector firms which have 85
percent of the general insurance market and over 90 percent of the life insurance market. Foreign
ownership is only allowed in free-zones, although the Government committed to allow foreign
presence in domestic market through joint ventures by 1999, subject to a maximum equity stake
of 49 percent.
12No comprehensive estimates exist of the total cost and incidence of the various regulatory
barriers that confront Egyptian producers and traders. The standards regime alone has been
estimated to have a negative direct impact equivalent to one percent of GDP (Nathan Associates,
1996). Adopting a more competitive regulatory regime for telecommunications would generate a
net welfare gain of $800 million (Galal, 1998), or 1.2 percent of GDP. Indirect effects-e.g.,
through discouraging investment-will  increase total costs further.
A number of initiatives have been taken in recent years to study and reduce red tape costs.
Documentary requirements have been simplified, the incidence of stamp duties reduced, and fees
for port and related services lowered. The shipping monopoly is in the process of being
abolished." 1 While these initiatives have improved the situation, much more remains to be done.
In principle, implementation of an FTA with the EU could help to achieve a reduction in red tape
costs through a process of simplification and abolition of administrative controls and
harmonization and mutual recognition of standards. Our analysis below explores this issue
further.
4.  The Model and Benchmark Data
A competitive, constant returns to scale computable general equilibrium model is used to
explore the magnitude of the potential gains from deeper integration. The formal equations and
notation of the model are presented in the appendix.  12 Egypt is modeled as a price taker on world
markets: policy changes are assumed not to significantly alter prices in other regions of the world.
9  Financial  Times,  September 25,  1997,  p. 8.
12  See Maskus  and Konan (1997)  for a fuller  description  of the model.
13Constant returns to scale and perfect competition imply that prices equal marginal costs of output.
Final outputs are produced according to a Leontief function using intermediate inputs and real value
added (Figure 1).) A constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function describes the
substitutability between labor and capital inputs in producing real value-added. Intermediate inputs
and final goods are differentiated  by country of origin according to the Armington assumption, so
that export and import prices differ across regions." 4 In each sector, demand for domestically
produced and imported goods is represented by a CES function, and intermediate imports are also
differentiated by region of supply in a CES structure. Similarly, Egyptian industries supply
regionally differentiated goods to both domestic and foreign markets (exports). Production follows
a nested two-stage constant elasticity of transformation (CET) function. Total output is first
calculated as the sum of domestic supply and total exports, with the latter then being allocated
across regions (EU, US, Arab League, and ROW) according to a sub-CET function.
Capital is assumed to be partially mobile in the sense that there are a number of resource
constrained sectors, which we take to be agriculture (VG1, VG2, ANI)), mining (OIL, MIN),
utilities (ELE), and transport (TRN).  In all other sectors capital is freely mobile.  The intention
underlying this assumption is to capture resource constraints that limit intersectoral factor flows
and output changes.  In particular, the ability to expand agricultural production is limited by
significant water scarcities and there are also constraints on output in crude petroleum and the
3  A CES structure  for production,  assuming  a substitution  elasticity  of 0.5, leads  to very  similar  results.
14  This  assumption  may seem  inconsistent  with  the small open  economy  notion  that Egypt is a price taker on world
markets. However,  this approach  is quite  standard  in the literature,  and  there is no obvious  way to address  this issue
given the data at hand. De Melo and Robinson  (1989) show  that models  that allow  product  differentiation  are well
behaved  under a small open economy  assumption;  in effect  the economy  is a price  taker at the level of aggregate
trade flows and each region's aggregation  is sufficiently  distinctive  to support  the Armington  assumption.
14Suez Canal.  To address the latter problem, transportation exports are held constant in the
counterfactuals.
A representative consumer maximizes a nested CES utility function with a corresponding
multi-staged budget constraint. In the first stage, the consumer decides how much to spend on
goods from each sector, given the budget constraint. Income elasticities across sectors are set at
unity as given by a Cobb-Douglas (CD) utility nest. In the second nest, the consumer determines
domestic and aggregate import expenditures in each sector according to a CES function. Then
given a budget for imports, the consumer selects purchases of imports from each region. These
latter functions also characterize the split between government consumption and investment
spending on domestic and imported goods and services. The representative consumer receives
income from primary factors (production labor, non-production labor, and capital), net transfers
from the government, the current-account deficit, as well as any net economic rents from the
operation of nontariff barriers to trade.
Intermediate inputs are disaggregated into domestic sources and imports to incorporate
importing costs and tariffs in purchases for the production sector. Sector-specific proportionate
import costs (u;) and export costs (v 1) capture the impact of regulatory barriers, or "red tape". As
discussed in Section 2, these have a variety of different dimensions, depending on whether formal
bilateral agreements are a precondition for removal on either the import and/or export side,
whether they are frictional or rent-creating, and whether removal would be applied on a MFN
basis. Insufficient data exists to allow a breakdown of the existing set of NTBs into these
categories. Examples of costs that can be removed on a unilateral and nondiscriminatory (MFN)
basis include administrative  procedures and time-related costs due to inspection delays or
monopoly port services. Examples of costs that could require formal bilateral agreements may
15include product standards and certification regimes and recognition of national licensing schemes
and qualification requirements for professional service providers. In the absence of information on
the distribution of deep integration benefits between the EU and the rest of the world, in the
simulations we assume that half of any "red tape" cost reduction on goods imports are
"bilateral:" that is, elimination is conditional on the negotiation of a MRA and benefits only EU-
Egypt trade flows.
Regulatory barriers also vary in their implementation from being frictional to being
resource-using and rent seeking. The simulation exercises consider both possibilities. In the case of
frictional barriers, we assume that a reduction in import costs shifts "rent revenues" to the consumer
(representative agent) in the forn  of increased purchasing power. In contrast, resource-using
barriers impose further costs on society as they employ resources wastefully. That is, they are
directly-unproductive  and the rents are dissipated. In either case, changes in aggregate
consumption are a direct measure of "equivalent variation," with the cost of living index associated
with the utility function chosen as numeraire. We assume frictional costs associated with customs-
related "red tape" to equal 5 percent of the value of imports. Removal of these costs will benefit all
trade on an MFN basis. In addition, we assume rent-creating costs of 10 percent, associated with
the "quality standards" regime. We regard these as rent-creating because most of the standards-
related controls are applied to goods that in the past were subject to QRs and import bans.
Recognizing that some of these standards may require a MRA in order to be abolished, we assume
further that only 50 percent of these standards-related  import barriers can be eliminated on an MFN
basis.
MRA-type of agreements concluded in the context of an FTA with the EU should also
result in improved market access opportunities as Egyptian goods no longer are subject to
16inspection costs and associated uncertainty upon entry into the EU. We assume that these costs are
equivalent to a five percent import "tax" on food and agricultural produce (given reports that
sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures have been used by the EU to block imports-see  World
Bank, 1995), a two percent barrier on textiles, and a conservative  one percent tariff equivalent for
other goods. We also impose a frictional export "tax" on Egyptian producers of 2 percent, to reflect
the existence of fees and red tape costs that have been documented in surveys of the private sector
(World Bank, 1995).
One of the impacts of deeper integration with the EU will potentially be greater
competition in service markets by Egyptian firms, foreign suppliers, and foreign direct
investment. To appropriately model the service sector would require information on the nature of
present market imperfections and the potential form that an open market might take. We
approximate the current environment with a conservative 15 percent across the board markup on
service production. 1 5 In addition, cost-raising regulatory barriers equivalent to a 100 percent
markup on international telecommunications and a 30 percent markup on international transport
are imposed. These apply to exports and imports of goods and services, with the incidence of the
additional "tax" across sectors depending on the intensity of the use of these service inputs, as
revealed by the input-output table. Also, we apply a 100 percent markup on distribution services
to reflect the fact that entry into this activity is prohibited to foreign nationals. Finally, there are
barriers on European imports of Egyptian services. We assume a relatively modest 50 percent
tariff equivalent on exports of construction, professional and personal services (CON, HSG,
"5  Comprehensive  estimates  of the cost-raising  effects  of regulatory  regimes  that restrict  competition  in service
markets  are lacking. However,  many case studies  of individual  sectors  suggest  that excess  costs are more  than 15
percent. See Section  2 above, World  Bank (1995)  and the contributions  in Galal  and Hoekman  (1997)  for a
discussion.
17REC, PER). Removal of these service export barriers is assumed to require a MRA (i.e., the
liberalization is discriminatory). However, liberalization of Egyptian service barriers is assumed
to be applied strictly on a MFN basis. Throughout the counterfactuals, service trade barriers are
rent creating, where the rents generated are collected by the representative agent.
Two standard closure rules are imposed: the savings-investment balance (equation A12)
and a fixed current account balance (equation A14). The savings-investment balance is based on
the assumption that the capital stock is exogenously fixed at the benchmark level.  This stock is
financed through forced consumer savings that acts as a direct (lump-sum) tax.  A capital good is
modeled as composite goods of fixed composition. Firms buy composite capital according to their
preferences. The interest rate (an index price of the composite capital stock) is endogenous and
determined by factor demand conditions.' 6 The current-account imbalance is held constant at its
benchmark level throughout the simulations. Foreign currencies are scaled so that the appropriate
GDP deflator ("world" price index) is one. Given the small-economy assumption, the world price
index is held constant throughout the analysis. Because the benchmark current account is in deficit,
it represents an addition to the representative agent's income through exogenous capital inflows, as
noted in equation (A12). To hold B fixed while international prices are constant requires a
balancing item in equation (A14). This is accomplished  by means of a change in the home "real
exchange rate," which refers implicitly to a change in the home price index (generated by changes
in price of home-produced goods) sufficient to sustain a constant current-account deficit measured
6 No distinction  is made  between  domestic  capital  and capital  inflows  from  foreign  direct  investment  (FDI). The
impact  of trade liberalization  on the volume  of FDI is generally  ambiguous.  Tariff  reduction  will lower  the incentive  of
foreign  firms  to service  Egyptian  markets  with  "tariffjumping"  FDI. In contrast,  lower  tariffs  on intermediate  imports
may encourage  export-oriented  FDI. These  issues  are beyond  the scope  of the present  analysis. See  Brown,  Deardorff
and Stem  (1997)  for an exploration  of the issue  in  the context  of the EU-Tunisia  agreement.
18at world prices." 7 Thus, B is held fixed, along with the price terms, requiring e to change as import
and export volumes change.
The government budget deficit is a deduction in available income for the representative
agent, constituting a transfer to government consumption. The deficit is held fixed during our
simulations. Thus, if a policy reform causes prices to fall, thereby reducing the tax revenues
required to finance government expenditures, this tax saving is transferred to the representative
agent.  At the same time, if trade liberalization results in lost tariff revenues, the revenues are
recouped by means of allowing GST tax rates, xci,  to vary. The GST is applied on sales of goods
and services at rates ranging from zero to 25. The standard tax rate is 10 percent (see Table 2 for
benchmark GST rates). 1 8 Taxes paid by firms on their intermediate input purchases are recoverable
through a tax credit, with the exception of purchases of investment goods and some service inputs.
Absent sufficient information on these tax credit exceptions, we choose to model the tax as a levy
solely on final goods purchases, assuming that taxes on all inputs are credited back to purchasing
firms.
The data for the model consist of a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) and other parameters,
such as elasticities of substitution and transformation, 19 import and export trade flows by region,
'7  A rise in the "real exchange  rate" is consistent  with a depreciation  of home currency,  in that the per-unit  price of
foreign  exchange  rises.
18  Tax  rates  on capital  are held constant.  Effective  corporate  tax rates  calculated  for 1990  are reported  in Table  2.
Legislated  corporate  tax rates  are considerably  higher  than  these  effective  rates,  which  reflect  tax holidays,  depreciation
schedules,  and various  exemptions.  Available  information  indicates  that  there  is no tax on agriculture,  approximately  a
23% effective  tax on services,  and  approximately  an 18%  tax on manufactures,  which  we apply  also  to the mining  and
crude oil sectors. These  rates  have  been  incorporated  into the 1990  SAM  to calibrate  the benchmark  economy.
19  As there  is also  little  empirical  evidence  on Egyptian  elasticities,  labor-capital  substitution  is allowed  to vary  across
industries,  using  estimates  from  Harrison,  Jones,  Kimbell  and Wigle  (1992). Labor-labor  substitution  is set at a
conservative  0.50  (see  Table  2). Benchmark  trade  elasticities  are drawn  from  Rutherford,  Rutstrom  and Tarr  (1993).
The  various  trade  elasticities  are 2.0 for substitution  between  domestic  and imported  goods,  5.0 for substitution  among
regional  imports  and  for transformation  between  domestic  output  and exports,  and  8.0 for  transformation  among
19and tax and tariff rates.  These data are assembled into a consistent set of relationships between
intermediate demand, final demand, and value-added  transactions using the 1989/1990 input-output
table for Egypt, updated to incorporate trade and tax policies and trade shares as of 1994.2° Trade
and tariff data by 8-digit HS line were aggregated to the input-output sectoral basis using import
weights consistent with the concordance between the input-output table and the tariff classification.
From these data, regional trade shares for 1994 were applied to 1990 trade volumes on the input-
output basis.  Egypt does not realize the full revenue that would obtain if statutory tariff rates were
applied to all imports because of various exemptions for duty-drawback provisions and investment
incentives. Thus weighted legal tariff rates were scaled downward (by some 20 percent) to ensure
consistency with total import duty collections in 1994. To take into account the existence of the
quantitative restrictions on imports of textiles and clothing, the statutory MFN rates for this sector
have been doubled.
5. Preferential Trade Liberalization: Simulations and Results
Various preferential trade-liberalization scenarios for Egypt are analyzed with the model, involving
different combinations of FTAs with the EU and the Arab region. The first, Table 3 Column (1), is
a shallow partnership agreement with the European Union in which Egypt preferentially removes
all tariffs on EU goods but does not liberalize non-tariff barriers or service barriers. 21 The second
regional  export  destinations.  These  parameters  are  consistent  with  the  ranges  of  elasticities  reported  in Lofgren  (1994).
Results of sensitivity  analysis  with  respect  to the various  trade  elasticities  are reported  in Maskus  and Konan  (1997).
20  See  Maskus  and Konan (1997)  for a detailed  discussion  of the updating  procedure,  which involved  re-calibrating
the model  on the basis  of the 1994  policy  parameters.
21 Throughout  the counterfactual  simulations  the beverage  tariff is not changed  to reflect Egypt's social  policy  for
maintaining  rigorous  barriers  on imported  alcoholic  beverages. Similarly,  tariffs on tobacco  products  are held fixed
20allows for deep integration and assumes a limited agreement is reached that will result in
liberalization of Egyptian import and export regulatory barriers on a MFN basis (Columns (2)
and (4)). No additional market access gains are likely in the EU: agricultural markets remain
protected and Egypt already enjoys duty-free access to EU markets.for manufactures.
Another possibility for deep integration is that negotiations will also remove 'standards-
related' costs on a discriminatory basis through formal mutual recognition-type agreements
(MRA) with the EU.  The MRA scenarios (Columns (3) and (5)) combine MFN liberalization of
nondiscriminatory barriers and removal of standards NTBs on imports from the EU (so that
standards liberalization does not extend to the rest of the world). Moreover, the EU responds by
providing somewhat improved access to its markets. This is assumed to be equivalent to a one
percent increase in export price for all commodities except agriculture and textiles/clothing,
where a five and two percent terms of trade improvement occurs, respectively. These
improvements are assumed to reflect the removal by the EU of frictional customs clearance- and
standards-related costs.
We also distinguish between an agreement limited strictly to agriculture and
manufacturing trade (Columns (1) to (3)) and one extending to the service sector (Columns (4)
and (5)).  As discussed above, all service barriers are assumed to be rent-generating, Egyptian
barriers are applied on a MFN basis, and the "MRAs" have the potential to remove European
barriers to exports of Egyptian services such as construction, professional, and personal services.
Finally, we analyze the impact of an EU agreement against the backdrop of the FTA with
the Arab League nations that was agreed in 1997 (Table 4). The Arab League agreement is a
in order to reflect the fact that governments in the region will continue to impose high excises on these products for
revenue and health purposes.
21"classic" FTA under which oniy tariffs are removed. As the Arab region is both a major
destination of Egyptian exports and tariff levels in the region are significantly higher than those
that are applied in the EU and US markets, in principle liberalization of Arab trade barriers can
have a major impact on Egyptian welfare. We compute the applied tariff rates in the benchmark
case as a function of actual trade weights (the Arab region's terms of trade adjust as a percentage
of the weighted average tariff rates), reported in Table 2.22
Table 3 reports results for Egypt-EU FTA scenarios. If the agreement is restricted to a
shallow FTA with no improved access to EU markets, trade diversion generates an estimated
welfare loss of 0.  14 percent is generated over be-ichmark 1994 levels. The real exchange rate
(ERATE) or shadow price of foreign currency increases by 1.2 percent in order to maintain the
benchmark current account deficit. The goods and services tax (GST) falls by about 4.5 percent.
As the reformed tariffs become more efficient tax collection tools, the GST can be lowered,
implying a gain in welfare for the represe'ntative  agent. Despite a decrease in tariff collections,
governmnent  budget neutrality implies a reduction in the GST as resources and consumption flow
into highly domestically-taxed sectors in response to the fall in tariffS. 23 Real returns to both
factors, production and non-production labor (PL  WAGE and NLWAGE) increase by more than
2 percent, reflecting enhanced efficiency in the economy. Interest rates are also driven up a
percent reflecting an enhanced demand for capital.  Trade becomes more focused on the EU, with
22 Data for Jordan's  and Lebanon's tariffs were comipiled  from Hoekman and Djankov (1 997); Morocco's and
Tunisia's tariffs were obtained from Rutherford et al. (1993, 1995) A concordance consistent with the Egyptian 1O
table was developed to map tariffs into the 38 sectors of the model.  Tariffs were weighted by 1996 imnport  shares,
using the UN COMTRADE data base.
23 That govemment revenues may increase in response to a piecemeal tariff reform is discussed in Konan and
Maskus (1  997b).
22import quantities increasing by over thirty percent with the EU and falling with the rest of the
world.
Deep integration scenarios have a substantially larger impact in terms of welfare, ranging
from four percent to over thirty percent of real GDP, depending on whether services are
liberated. All deep integration scenarios involve elimination of nondiscriminatory trade costs.
Whether an MRA is reached to eliminate EU standards-related costs is important especially if
services are involved. In the case of liberalization of trade in goods only, elimination of frictional
barriers (5 percent tariff equivalent for red tape and 5 percent due to standards-related costs) on
an MFN basis generates substantial economic gains estimated at 4 percent of real GDP, Table 3
Column (2).  These gains are fairly evenly spread across society as labor income grows by over 5
percent and returns to capital increase by about 4 percent.  Reaching a deeper MRA-type
agreement that eliminates the remaining five percent Egyptian standards-related barrier, as well
as EU barriers to Egyptian exports on a discriminatory, bilateral basis would magnify these
effects: welfare improves over benchmark 1994 levels by an estimated 5.6 percent. Imports from
the EU increase by nearly two-thirds and fall with other trading partners.
According to our estimations, service liberalization has the potential to substantially
improve the Egyptian economy with welfare gains ranging from 13 percent from MFN Egyptian
liberalization of the service sector to twenty percent if, additionally, an MRA is reached that
improves access to European service markets.  In the former case (MFN, Column (4)) service
liberalization substantially increases Egypt's  export position especially with the Middle East -
North Africa region where export quantities triple.  In the service liberalization - MRA scenario
(Column (5)), welfare gains are largely driven by the improvements in Egyptian access to
European service markets, discussed above, which we model as a fifty percent increase in the
23European price of construction, personal and professional services.  This improvement in
European access diverts Egyptian exports from other regions, including MENA, as trade focuses
on the EU.  Trade is substantially redirected toward the EU with EU imports more than doubling
and exports increasing by thirty percent in quantity terms.
Adding a FTA between Egypt and the members of the Arab League results in larger
welfare gains for Egypt, even if there is no deep integration associated with the EU FTA (0.78
percent instead of -0.14 percent) (Table 4). This is not surprising given that intra-Arab trade
barriers are much higher than those applying to Egypt's  exports to the EU.  The Arab League
FTA could give rise to large increases in intra-regional trade with exports to the Arab region
rising by 7 hundred million US dollars, while the value of imports from the region rise by 87
million US dollars relative to the 1994 benchmark. Implementation of the Arab FTA results in
large reductions in exports to the EU and the US, as Egyptian producers reorient their goods to
the region. The Arab FTA increases the payoff to deep integration with the EU as
well-depending  on assumptions regarding MFN vs. MRA, welfare could rise by up to 7 percent
of GDP.  These are quite high numbers for the type of static, competitive model that is used, and
largely reflect the high MFN tariff levels that apply in the Arab region.
6.  Conclusions
Given Egypt's highly diversified trading patterns, a shallow PTA with the EU has the potential to
be merely diversionary and lead to a small welfare decline. Reflecting the fact that Egypt already
has duty-free access to the EU for manufactures-the  loss in tariff revenues that will be incurred
outweighs any trade creation that will result. Large welfare gains from a EU FTA are conditional
upon the elimination of regulatory barriers and red tape. If deep integration efforts are pursued
24that deliver such an improvement in the business environment, the welfare gains may be
substantial, from 4 percent to upwards of 20 percent growth in real GNP.  The variance in these
impact results indicates that it is important to have a good sense of how large the regulatory costs
are, whether elimination of regulatory barriers can be applied on a nondiscriminatory basis, and
whether the barriers create rents or are largely frictional in nature. In the case of Egypt, a case
can be made that frictional costs are likely to be large, to represent a major share of the total costs
imposed by the regulatory regime, and not to require MRA-type formal agreements as a
condition of their abolition. But the fact remains that we do not have reliable information on any
of these key parameters.
Our results suggest that the additional impact of services liberalization may be
significant.  Improvements in service efficiency lead not only to a gain in domestic welfare and
output but also to an improved export position, especially with MENA.  The potential welfare
gains to better access to European service markets may be quite substantial. Given low trade
barriers in the EU and the relatively high tariffs maintained by Egypt and other Arab countries, it
is not surprising that there are potentially large gains associated with intra-Arab trade
liberalization. Here again much depends on the availability of accurate information on the actual
trade policies of the Arab countries vis a vis each other.  These are difficult to come by. To the
best of our knowledge, no comparable cross-country empirical analyses have been undertaken to
estimate what the tariff equivalents are of the various regulation-related trade costs that currently
exist in the Arab region more generally. Without such empirical work-which  should span both
product and service markets-computational  work of the kind attempted in this paper will
necessarily be subject to large margins of error.
25That being said, it is important that not too much be made of the weakness of the datasets
that are available. The major points that emerge from the analysis are fully consistent with the
policy prescriptions that emerge from economic theory and analytical models.  PTAs that are
limited to the elimination of tariffs for merchandise trade flows are of limited value at best.  Such
PTAs may as easily be welfare reducing as welfare enhancing. It is important that PTAs go
beyond elimination of tariffs and quotas to include regulatory and red tape costs, as well as
efforts to open service markets to foreign competition. Both policymakers and analysts must take
into account that some types of "red tape" stemming from the enforcement of regulatory regimes
cannot be eliminated on an MFN basis. To the extent that this is the case, account must be taken
of the need to negotiate MRAs and equivalent instruments. These may give rise to large gains,
but should be pursued on a MFN basis, i.e., in the WTO context.
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28TABLE 1:  BENCHMARK OUTPUT AND TRADE SHARES
SECTOR  Output  Import 4 Exporte
Total  EU@  US  MENA'  Total  EU@  US  MENA!
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)
AGRICULTURE
1. Vegetable  products, foodstuffs (VG1)  12.4  13.3  11.7  47.9  2.2  2.6  27.0  1.5  63.5
2.  Vegetable  products, non-foodstuffs (VG2)  1.7  0.0  36.9  16.5  1.2  0.1  49.3  13.4  14.1
3.  Animalproducts(ANI)  8.0  0.8  82.7  0.0  9.6  0.3  35.2  2.3  53.0
MINING AND QUARRYING
4.  Crude petroleum and natural gas (OIL)  2.7  1.2  52.0  7.0  24.4  18.5  30.6  4.6  1.0
5.  Other extractive industries (MIN)  .09  2.0  17.7  14.8  3.5  0.2  56.8  9.2  21.4
MANUFACTURING
6.  Food processing  (FOO)  7.7  15.1  40.3  10.6  2.3  1.3  20.1  4.5  49.3
7.  Beverages (BEV)  0.6  0.0  41.7  16.3  28.5  0.0  1.2  0.0  87.6
8.  Tobacco products (TOB)  1.9  1.0  27.0  27.4  2.5  0.0  0.4  0.7  45.3
9.  Cotton ginning  and pressing (TX1)  1.2  0.5  36.9  0.3  0.9  4.2  33.7  0.2  1.4
10. Cotton spinning and weaving (TX2)  5.2  2.4  33.4  7.1  3.7  10.3  72.4  10.9  6.1
11. Clothing:  assembled and pieces (CLO)  1.4  - 0.0  12.4  0.9  19.1  1.2  34.7  49.1  8.6
12. Leather  products, excl. shoes (LEA)  0.2  0.0  25.7  0.9  13.8  0.1  48.8  1.5  30.9
13. Shoes (SHO)  0.4  0.0  16.0  2.9  12.0  0.0  20.5  1.9  60.5
14. Woodproducts, excl. furniture (WOO)  1.1  5.0  39.8  1.4  0.4  0.1  1.5  0.1  86.1
15. Furniture (FUR)  1.4  0.0  57.0  34.7  1.4  0.5  14.9  10.6  58.5
16.  Paper and printing (PAP)  1.5  3.3  46.8  17.1  2.9  0.9  1.6  0.8  91.7
17. Chemicals,  excl petro. (CHE)  3.1  10.8  62.6  12.2  7.9  1.8  31.3  3.5  39.4
18. Petroleum  refining (PET)  2.7  1.2  48.4  6.2  28.9  3.3  58.5  0.6  7.2
19. Rubber, plastics and products (RPL)  0.8  2.3  42.8  20.4  9.8  0.3  41.3  0.7  45.3
20. Porcelain, china, pottery (POR)  0.3  0.4  47.4  7.8  11.5  0.1  42.2  1.5  32.4
21. Glass and products (GLA)  0.3  0.5  63.3  5.3  3.6  0.1  9.3  5.5  62.1
22. Mineral  products, n.e.i. (MPD)  1.7  0.4  61.6  3.8  2.2  0.0  4.8  2.0  80.9
23. Iron, steel, other base metals (MET)  2.8  2.6  35.5  11.8  9.0  0.8  68.3  1.9  24.3
24. Machinery and appliances (MAC)  3.5  23.1  59.4  17.4  2.4  4.6  9.5  3.9  58.0
25. Transportation  equipment (TRA)  1.0  5.9  33.8  12.1  0.7  0.4  3.6  0.3  89.8
26. Other manufacturing (OMF)  0.1  0.5  47.6  11.2  3.5  0.1  25.4  3.2  62.5TABLE 1:  BENCHMARK OUTPUT AND TRADE SHARES (Continued)
SECTOR  Output*  Import#  Exporte
Total  EU@  US  MENA'  Total  EU@  US  MENA!
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)
SERVICES  AND OTHER
27. Electricity, gas, and water (ELE)  1.7  0.2  44.6  16.8  4.3  0.7  25.0  7.0  40.0
28. Construction  (CON)  5.5  0.2  44.6  16.8  4.3  0.8  25.0  7.0  40.0
29. Trade (TRD)  7.1  0.3  44.6  16.8  4.3  5.6  25.0  7.0  40.0
30. Restaurants,  hotels, coffeehouses (RES)  2.3  0.0  44.6  16.8  4.3  5.0  25.0  7.0  40.0
31. Transport and storage (TRN)  6.0  1.3  44.6  16.8  4.3  31.9  44.7  6.7  20.2
32. Communications (COM)  0.8  0.1  44.6  16.8  4.3  0.4  25.0  7.0  40.0
33. Financial establishments  (FIN)  1.5  1.1  44.6  16.8  4.3  0.0  25.0  7.0  40.0
34. Insurance (INS)  0.3  0.0  44.6  16.8  4.3  0.5  25.0  7.0  40.0
35. Real estate, housing services (HSG)  2.8  3.9  44.6  16.8  4.3  0.0  25.0  7.0  40.0
36. Social and community services (SER)  6.0  0.1  44.6  16.8  4.3  0.2  25.0  7.0  40.0
37. Recreational  and cultural  services (REC)  0.5  0.2  44.6  16.8  43.  3.2  25.0  7.0  40.0
38. Personal services (PER)  0.9  0.0  44.6  16.8  4.3  0.0  25.0  7.0  40.0
otes:  a  Including  Turkey;  ! Excluding  Israel.
Source:  Modified  from  Konan and Maskus  1997.
30TABLE 2:  Government Policy and Elasticity Parameters (%)
SECTOR  GST-94  K Tax-  Egypt  MENA  ESUBKL
94  Tariff,  Tariff
1994
(2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
AGRICULTURE
1. Vegetable  products,  foodstuffs  (VGI)  0.0  0.0  2.5  6.3  0.95
2. Vegetable  products,  non-foodstuffs  (VG2)  10.0  0.0  6.7  28.9  0.95
3. Animal  products  (ANI)  0.0  0.0  4.4  6.7  0.95
MINING  AND  QUARRYING
4. Crude  petroleum  and  natural  gas (OIL)  0.0  18.0  8.2  2.9  0.43
5. Other  extractive  industries  (MIN)  10.0  18.0  7.0  15.6  0.43
MANUFACTURING
6. Food  processing  (FOO)  0.0  18.0  6.8  18.3  0.95
7. Beverages  (BEV)  10.0  18.0  953.2  14.8  0.95
8. Tobaccoproducts(TOB)  10.0  18.0  65.5  83.1  0.95
9. Cottonginningandpressing(TXl)  10.0  18.0  17.3  24.9  0.93
10.  Cotton  spinning  and weaving  (TX2)  10.0  18.0  23.3  17.4  0.93
11.  Clothing:  assembled  and pieces  (CLO)  10.0  18.0  53.7  32.5  1.19
12.  Leather  products,  excl.  shoes  (LEA)  10.0  18.0  34.8  44.6  0.75
13.  Shoes  (SHO)  10.0  18.0  51.8  36.9  0.75
14. Wood, excl. furniture (WOO)  5.0  18.0  8.1  28.1  0.93
15. Furniture (FUR)  10.0  18.0  46.9  34.9  0.93
16. Paper and printing (PAP)  0.0  18.0  13.3  18.6  1.00
17. Chemical, excl petroleum (CHE)  5.0  18.0  8.9  17.6  1.01
18. Petroleum refining (PET)  0.0  18.0  7.1  20.0  0.43
19. Rubber, plastics and products (RPL)  10.0  18.0  15.6  24.7  0.97
20. Porcelain, china, pottery (POR)  10.0  18.0  43.5  21.3  0.93
21. Glass and products (GLA)  10.0  18.0  29.6  17.2  0.97
22. Mineral products, n.e.i. (MPD)  5.0  18.0  18.1  12.7  0.43
23. Iron, steel, other base metals (MET)  10.0  18.0  17.2  32.6  0.43
24. Machinery and appliances (MAC)  25.0  18.0  17.9  19.9  1.20
25. Transportation equipment (TRA)  25.0  18.0  41.2  56.6  1.88
26. Other manufacturing (OMF)  10.0  18.0  19.3  24.9  1.19
SERVICES AND OTHER
27. Electricity, gas, and water (ELE)  2.5  23.0  0.0  0.0  1.88
28. Construction (CON)  10.0  23.0  0.0  0.0  1.99
29. Trade (TRD)  8.0  23.0  0.0  0.0  1.28
30. Restaurants, hotels, coffeehouses (RES)  8.0  23.0  0.0  0.0  1.99
31. Transport and storage (TRN)  0.0  23.0  0.0  0.0  1.88
32. Communications (COM)  5.0  23.0  0.0  0.0  1.99
33. Financial establishments (FIN)  8.0  23.0  0.0  0.0  1.99
34. Insurance (INS)  0.0  23.0  0.0  0.0  1.99
35.  Real estate  and  housing  services  (HSG)  8.0  23.0  0.0  0.0  1.99
36. Social and community services (SER)  10.0  23.0  0.0  0.0  1.99
37. Recreational  and cultural services (REC)  8.0  23.0  0.0  0.0  1.99
38.  Personal  services  (PER)  10.0  23.0  0.0  0.0  1.99
Adjusted  to be consistent  with the real value  of the 1990  government  deficit.  MENA  tariff is trade weighted.
Source:  Based on World Bank data and author's calculations.Table 3:  Impacts of Egyptian-EU Trade Agreement
Shallow  Deep Integration:  Deep Integration:
Integration;  Service costs fixed  Service costs also removed
No reduction in  MFN only:  MFN + MRA:  MFN: = (2) +  MFN+MRA:
regulatory costs  5% red tape;  (3) + 5% cut in  elimination of  (4) + EU gives
5% standards  standards costs;  15% services  access to
increase in  cost markup &  Egyptian
export prices in  service-specific  service
EU markets  trade barriers  exports
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Macroeconomic Variables (% change)
Welfare (EV)  -0.138  4.151  5.626  13.457  20.637
Exchange Rate  1.222  3.425  3.422  4.137  -11.852
Goods and Service Tax  4.484  2.326  3.912  0.908  28.883
Average Tariff  4.676  4.509  3.901  4.462  3.822
Tariff Revenue  -1.627  -1.550  -1.658  -1.495  -1.369
Production Wage  2.022  5.143  5.925  13.458  30.117
Non-production Wage  3.202  6.726  7.085  12.229  36.970
Interest Rate  0.979  4.095  5.064  8.020  13.566
Trade Creation  (US$bn)  0.095  0.126  0.166  0.136  0.490
Trade Diversion US$bn  0.123  0.100  0.132  0.083  0.045
Export Value Share
EU  0.306  0.305  0.320  0.156  0.451
uS  0.050  0.049  0.047  0.029  0.023
MENA  0.350  0.353  0.358  0.650  0.332
Import Value Share
EU  0.542  0.544  0.589  0.537  0.575
uS  0.149  0.150  0.137  0.154  0.145
MENA  0.032  0.032  0.028  0.032  0.029
Export Value (change US$ billion)
EU  0.056  0.083  0.225  0.095  0.372
US  0.011  0.015  0.014  0.048  -0.117
MENA  0.081  0.129  0.238  4.176  -0.201
Import Value (change US$ billion)
EU  0.933  1.350  1.906  1.536  3.378
US  -0.186  -0.057  -0.118  0.044  0.374
MENA  -0.047  -0.023  -0.044  -0.009  0.0.43
Export Quantity (% change)
EU  4.520  6.769  18.222  7.686  30.156
US  5.676  7.568  7.158  24.224  -59.046
MENA  5.805  9.211  17.026  298.903  -14.406
Import Quantity (% change)
EU  31.360  45.356  64.036  51.605  181.188
US  -13.905  -4.291  -8.801  3.288  76.751
MENA  -16.169  -7.962  -14.873  -2.918  57.332
32Table 4: Impacts  of Egyptian  - EU Trade  Agreement  with an Arab  League FTA
Shallow  Deep Integration  Deep Integration
Integration  (service costs fixed)  (service costs removed)
(All regulatory
costs kept fixed)
MFN  MRA  MFN  MRA
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Macroeconomic  Variables (% change)
Welfare (EV)  0.781  5.305  7.151  16.705  21.128
Exchange Rate  0.714  2.460  0.541  -3.891  -11.874
Goods and Service Tax  -0.783  -6.810  -6.199  -14.971  26.834
Average Tariff  4.388  4.349  3.871  4.040  3.484
Tariff Revenue  -1.647  -1.506  -1.539  -1.431  -1.467
Production Wage  3.064  7.825  11.571  33.577  31.561
Non-production Wage  -0.447  1.076  1.572  -0.502  34.295
InterestRate  3.905  8.561  11.093  19.157  15.101
Trade Creation  (US$bn)  0.261  0.455  0.660  0.234  0.477
Trade Diversion (US$bn)  0.100  0.057  0.067  0.035  0.046
Export Value Share
EU  0.254  0.231  0.217  0.185  0.415
US  0.039  0.035  0.029  0.028  0.021
MENA  0.461  0.510  0.557  0.565  0.376
Import Value Share
EU  0.534  0.539  0.589  0.527  0.565
US  0.146  0.144  0.130  0.151  0.143
MENA  0.048  0.049  0.043  0.052  0.044
Export Value (change US$ billion)
EU  -0.081  -0.133  -0.184  -0.566  0.239
US  -0.020  -0.033  -0.060  -0.096  -0.122
MENA  0.705  1.045  1.310  0.646  -0.045
Import Value (change US$ billion)
EU  1.025  1.611  2.485  2.192  3.340
US  -0.168  -0.021  -0.041  0.243  0.375
MENA  0.087  0.146  0.122  0.240  0.226
Export Quantity (lo change)
EU  -6.586  -10.814  -14.893  -45.920  19.426
US  -9.990  -16.879  -30.437  -48.540  -61.686
MENA  50.452  74.789  93.757  46.243  -3.253
Import Quantity (% change)
EU  34.451  54.109  83.485  73.650  112.229
US  -12.573  -1.553  -3.060  18.169  27.989
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US EU MENA ROWMODEL  EQUATIONS  AND NOTATION
A.  Production
1.  Labor  Aggregator  Li = [b  IiLIi(L-  1)/cL  + b2jL2i(UrL-l  )/aL]  aL/(aL-1)
2. Value  Added  Function  Vi = [aLiLi(cYi-I)/Oi  + aKiKj(ai-l)/Iaii/(ai-l)
3. Imported  Intermediates  MiN  = [£ZrrimriN("1'-  1y)/  1)
4. Composite  Intermediate  Zji  [1Ydidji(Td-L/Y  ni + ymimji(li-)'  T1]  TijlI('fj-1)
5. Final  Goods  Technology  Yi  min[zl  ial i,..,zni/ani,Vi/aVA]
6. Domestic & Foreign Sales  Yi  [ctDiDi(Ei-  )/si + aXiXi(Si-  )/Ei]  Ei/(Ei-  1)
7. Export  Allocation  [rXi  =  NriXri(ei-l  )/ei]ei/(ei-  1)
8. Marginal  Cost Condition  ciYi  = lj(l+vi)pjdji + Fjir(l+uj+trj)prjmmrji  +
Fi(l+xKi)wKKi + wLL  Li
B.  Utility
9. Utility  Function  U =IjCiXi;  Eixi  = I
10.  Domestic  & Import  Consumption  Ci  [ODiDiC(Yi-1)!  Yi + OMiCMiC(yi-l)/l i] Yi/yi-i
(applies  also to Gi and IiF)
I I  . Import Allocation  Mic  [=r8riMric(1i-ly)/]  Ti/Ti-I
(applies  also to MiG  and MiIF)
C. Constraints and Balancing Items
12.  Agent's  Budget  Constraint  zi  C  Ci  =WKEK  + WLEL + eB - Ei  IiF -_ipiIjI
(ui = 0 if NTBs  are frictional)  D + F-i  Er uiprimMri  +  ji  viYi
13.  Government  Budget  Constraint  Y-i  pG Gi = D + EirKiwKiKi  + ZitCi(  pj Ci+  ~pI IiF)
+ Zi.( l +TCi)triprim(MriC+MriIF)
14.  Current  Account  Balance  B =  ryi(l/e)(primMri  -PrixXri)
15.  Product  Market  Clearance  Si = -jaijYj  + Gi + IiF + II + Cj
16. Factor Market Clearance  YiKi  = EK  ;  ZiL,iFILL, XiL2i =E2L, Kj =  E
17.  Zero Profits  pi Di +  4rpriX Xri = ciYi
18. Supply Value Balance  p; Si = pZjaij(l+vi)Yj + (14+Ci)(pC  DiC+p 1IFDiIF) +
pG DiG+ fiF  IiI+-r(1+tCi)(1+ui+tri)prim(MriC
+MriIF)+yr( 1+ui+tri)primMriG
D. Price Relationships and Identities
19.  Components  of Domestic  Sales  Di = DiC  + DiIF  + II + DiG
20. Components  of Import Sales  Mi = MiN  + MiC + MiIF  + MiG
3521. Domestic Price of Intermediate Imports  PriN = (l + ui + tri)Prim
(holds also for imports for G)
22. Domestic Price of Imports for C  PriC = (1 + TCi)(I + Ui  + tri)Prim
(holds also for imports for IF)
23. Consumer Price of Domestic Goods  pic = (1 + tCi)(l  + vi)pi
(holds also for purchases for IF)
24. Capital-Market Equilibrium  TKI  + WK1  =..  =  + wKn  (mobile capital sectors)
LIST  OF VARIABLES
LIi, L2i  Production and non-production labor inputs, sector i (i= 1,  .. ,3 8)
Li  Aggregated labor input, sector i
Ki  Capital inputs, both mobile and immobile
Vi  Value added
Mi  Total imports
Mri  Imports from region r (r = EU, ROW)
MiN  Imports of commodity i for intermediate use
MriN  Imports for intermediate use from region r (r = US, EU, M!ENA,  ROW)
zji  Composite intermediate  input of j into i (j=1,...,38)
dji, mji  Intermediate usages of domestic and imported goods
Yi  Output of good i
Di, Xi  Output for domestic sales and exports
DiC, DiG, D 1IF  Domestic sales: private and public consumption, and capital formation
Xri  Exports of good i to region r
Ci  Index of marginal cost of production
Pi  Domestic producer price index
pZ  pC,  plF  -p  Domestic price indexes (home and imported prices)
pi 'i  pi  'Pi
wK, WL  Factor price indexes (where wK is fixed in resource-constrained sectors)
U  Utility
pj  Composite price index for total domestic supply
Ci, Gi  Private and public consumption
liF, IiI  Fixed capital formation and inventory investment
MiC, MiG  Imports for private and public consumption
MiIF  Imports for fixed capital formation
MriC, MriG  Imports for private and public consumption from region r
MriIF  Imports for fixed capital formation from region r
36e  Real exchange rate (price index for foreign exchange)
B  Current-account balance
D  Govermnent budget deficit (held fixed)
Si  Supply on domestic market (Di + Mi)
PriN  Domestic price index for intermediate imports
Pric, PriG  Domestic price indexes for imports for private and public consumption
priiF  Domestic price index for imports for gross capital formation
Pic, piIF  Price index for private consumption/fixed capital of domestic goods
Pri  Producer price index for goods exported to region r
tCi  Endogenous tax rate on consumption ("goods and services tax")
LIST  OF PARAMETERS
uL  Substitution elasticity between labor types
(yi  Substitution elasticity between capital and labor
71a  Substitution elasticity between intermediates and value added
li  Armington elasticity between EU and ROW imports
Ili  Substitution elasticity between domestic and imported intermediates
Si  Transformation elasticity between domestic and exported output
ei  Transformation elasticity between EU and ROW exports
Yi  Substitution elasticity between domestic and imported consunption
tKi  Tax rate on operating surplus ("capital tax")
tri  Tariff rate on imports from region r
Ui  NTB administrative cost rate on imports
vi  Service sector rents on domestic output (vi=O  for non-service sectors)
EK  9EL  2L  ' ERj  Endowment of capital, labor, and resource-constrained capital
Prim  Price of imports from region r
Prix  Price of exports in region r
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